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RETHINKING ISLAM TODAY ogy, mystification and mythologization, as well as the semantic relationship between myth and symbol and the role of the metaphor in mythical and symbolic discourse.
We still approach these concepts and use them with a rationalist positivist system of definitions, as the Qur'an did with asitfr al-awwalin (pre-Islamic mythology of the ancient people). However, the Qur'an created a symbolic alternative to the competing mythical and symbolic constructions of the ancient cultures in the Middle East. Our positivist rationalism criticizes symbols and myths and proposes, as an alternative, scientific conceptualism. We have neither a theory of symbol nor a clear conception of the metaphor to read, with a totalizing perspective, the religious texts. Religious tradition is one of the major problems we should rethink today. First, religions are mythical, symbolic, ritualistic ways of being, thinking, and knowing. They were conceived in and addressed to societies still dominated by oral and not written cultures. Scriptural religions based on a revealed Book contributed to a decisive change with far-reaching effects on the nature and functions of religion itself. Christianity and Islam (more than Judaism, until the creation of the Israeli state) became official ideologies used by a centralizing state which created written historiography and archives.
There is no possibility today of rethinking any religious tradition without making a careful distinction between the mythical dimension linked to oral cultures and the official ideological functions of the religion. We shall come back to this point because it is a permanent way of thinking that religion revealed and that social, cultural, and political activity maintained.
Tradition and orthodoxy are also unthought, unelaborated concepts in Islamic traditional thought. Tradition is reduced to a collection of"authentic" texts recognized in each community: Shi'i, Sunni, and Khariji. If we add to the Qur'an and Hadith, the methodology used to derive the Shari'a and the Corpusjuris in the various schools, we have other subdivisions of the three axes of Islamic tradition. I tried to introduce the concept of an exhaustive tradition worked up by a critical, modern confrontation of all the collections used by the communities, regardless of the "orthodox" limits traced by the classical authorities (Bukhari and Muslim for the Sunnis; Kul'i, Ibn Bbiuye, Abu Ja'far al-Tlsi for the Imamis; Ibn 'Ibad and others for the Kharijis). This concept is used by the Islamic revolution in Iran, but more as an ideological tool to accomplish the political unity of the umma. The historical confrontation of the corpuses, and the theoretical elaboration of a new, coherent science of Usuil al-fiqh and Usul al-din, are still unexplored and necessary tasks.
Beyond the concept of an exhaustive tradition based on a new definition of the Usul, there is the concept of tradition as it is used in anthropology today-the sum of customs, laws, institutions, beliefs, rituals, and cultural values which constitute the identity of each ethno-linguistic group. This level of tradition has been partially integrated by the Shari'a under the name of 'urf or 'amal (like al 'amal al-fasi in Fas), but it is covered and legitimized by the usuli methodology of the jurists. This aspect of tradition can be expressed in Arabic bytaqilid, but the concept of exhaus-21 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY tive tradition can be expressed by the word sunna only if it is re-elaborated in the perspective I mentioned.
Likewise, orthodoxy refers to two values. For the believers, it is the authentic expression of the religion as it has been taught by the pious ancestors (al-salafalsilih); the "orthodox" literature describes opposing groups as "sects" (firaq). For the historian, orthodoxy refers to the ideological use of religion by the competing groups in the same political space, like the Sunnis who supported the caliphatelegitimized afterwards by the jurists-and who called themselves "the followers of the tradition and the united community" (ahl al-sunna wa-al-jama'a). All the other groups were given polemical, disqualifying names like rawafid., khawarij, and baitiniyya. The Imamis called themselves "the followers of infallibility and justice" (ahl al 'isma wa-al-'ada-la), referring to an orthodoxy opposed to that of the Sunnis.
There has been no effort (jtihdd) to separate orthodoxy as a militant ideological endeavor, a tool of legitimation for the state and the "values" enforced by this state, from religion as a way proposed to man to discover the Absolute. This is another task for our moder project of rethinking Islam, and other religions.
II. Modes of Thinking
I would like to clarify and differentiate between the two modes of thinking that Muslim thinkers adopted at the inception of intellectual modernity in their societies (not only in thought), that is, since the beginning of the Nahda in the nineteenth century. I do not need to emphasize the well-known trend of salafi reformist thought initiated by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh. It is what I call the islahi way of thinking which has characterized Islamic thought since the death of the Prophet. The principle common to all Muslim thinkers, the 'ulama' mujtahidun, as well as to historians who adopted the theological framework imposed by the division of time into two parts-before/after the Hijra (like before/ after Christ)-is that all the transcendent divine Truth has been delivered to mankind by the Revelation and concretely realized by the Prophet through historical initiatives in Medina. There is, then, a definite model of perfect historical action for mankind, not only for Muslims. All groups at any time and in any social and cultural environment are bound to go back to this model in order to achieve the spirit and the perfection shown by the Prophet, his companions, and the first generation of Muslims called the pious ancestors (al-salafal-sailih).
This vision has been faithfully adopted and assumed by the program of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (founded in 1981 in Washington, D.C., "for the reform and progress of Islamic thought"). The publication of the Institute's International Conference in the Islamicization of Knowledge notes that the "human mind by itself with its limitations cannot comprehend the totality of the matter." This means that there is an "Islamic framework" constantly valid, transcendent, authentic, and universal in which all human activities and initiatives ought to be controlled and correctly integrated. Since the Islamic framework is part of the "Islamic legacy," one must always look back to the time when the Truth was formulated and implemented either in the model set in Medina by the Prophet and the Revelation or by recognized 'ulama' mujtahidun who correctly derived the Sharica using the rules of valid ijtihad. This is at the same time a methodology, an epistemology, and a theory of history. It is certainly an operative intellectual framework used and perpetuated by generations of Muslims since the debate on authority and power started inside the community according to patterns of thinking and representing the world specific to the islahi movement.
... To rethink Islam one must comprehend the socio-cultural genesis of isla-hi thinking and its impact on the historical destiny of the societies where this thinking has been or is actually dominant. To assess the epistemological validity of islihi thinking, one has to start from the radical and initial problems concerning the generative process, the structure and the ideological use of knowledge. By this, I mean any kind and level of knowledge produced by man living, acting, and thinking in a given social-historical situation. Radical thinking refers to the biological, historical, linguistic, semiotic condition shared by people as natural beings. From this perspective, the Revelation of Islam is only one attempt, among many others, to emancipate human beings from the natural limitations of their biological, historical, and linguistic condition. That is why, today, "Islamicizing knowledge" must be preceded by a radical epistemological critique of knowledge at the deepest level of its construction as an operative system used by a group in a given social-historical space. We need to differentiate ideological discourses produced by groups for assessing their own identity, power, and protection, from ideational discourses, which are controlled along the socio-historical process of their elaboration in terms of the new critical epistemology.
... The difference between the new emerging rationality and all inherited rationalities-including Islamic reason-is that the implicit postulates are made explicit and used not as undemonstrated certitudes revealed by God or formed by a transcendental intellect, but as modest, heuristic trends for research. In this spirit, here are six fundamental heuristic lines of thinking to recapitulate Islamic knowledge and to confront it with contemporary knowledge in the process of elaboration.
1. Human beings emerge as such in societies through various changing uses. Each use in the society is converted into a sign of this use, which means that realities are expressed through languages as systems of signs. Signs are the radical issue for a critical, controlled knowledge. This issue occurs prior to any attempt to interpret Revelation. Holy scripture itself is communicated through natural languages used as systems of signs, and we know that each sign is a locus of convergent operations (perception, expression, interpretation, translation, communication) engaging all of the relations between language and thought.
Remark 1 2. All semiotic productions of a human being in the process of his social and cultural emergence are subject to historical change which I call historicity. As a semiotic articulation of meaning for social and cultural uses, the Qur'an is subject to historicity. This means that there is no access to the absolute outside the phenomenal world of our terrestrial, historical existence. The various expressions given to the ontology, the first being the truth and the transcendence by theological and metaphysical reason, have neglected historicity as a dimension of the truth. Changing tools, concepts, definitions, and postulates are used to shape the truth.
Remark 2.1: This line is opposed to all medieval thinking based on stable essences and substances. The concept of Revelation should be reworked in the light of semiotic systems subjected to historicity. The Mu'tazili theory of God's created speech deserves special consideration along this new line.
Remark 2.2: The Aristotelian definition of formal logic and abstract categories also needs to be revised in the context of the semiotic theory of meaning and the historicity of reason.
3. There are many levels and forms of reason interacting with levels and forms of imagination as is shown in the tension between logos and muthos, or symbol and concept, metaphor and reality, or proper meaning, zadhir and bitin in Islam.
Recent anthropology has opened up the field of collective social imaginaire' not considered by traditional historiography and classical theology. Imagination and social imaginaire are reconsidered as dynamic faculties of knowledge and action. All the mobilizing ideologies, expressed in a religious or a secular framework, are produced, received, and used by social imaginaire, which also is related to imagination. The concept of social imaginaire needs more elaboration through many societies and historical examples. In Muslim societies, its role today is as decisive as in the Middle Ages because rationalist culture has less impact and presence there than in Western societies, which, nevertheless, also have their own imaginaire competing with various levels and forms of rationality.
4. Discourse as an ideological articulation of realities as they are perceived and used by different competing groups occurs prior to the faith. Faith is shaped, expressed, and actualized in and through discourse. Conversely, faith, after it has taken shape and roots through religious, political, or scientific discourse, imposes its own direction and postulates to subsequent discourses and behaviors (individual and collective).
Remark 4.1: The concept or notion of faith given by God and the classical theories of free will, grace, and predestination need to be re-elaborated within the concrete context of discourses through which any system of beliefs is expressed and assimilated. Faith is the crystallization of images, representations, and ideas commonly shared by each group engaged in the same historical experience. It is more than the personal relation to religious beliefs; but it claims a spiritual or a metaphysical dimension to give a transcendental significance to the political, social, ethical and aesthetic values to which refers each individual inside each unified social group, or community.
5. The traditional system of legitimization, represented by Usuil al-din and Usuil al-fiqh, no longer has epistemological relevance. The new system is not yet established in a unanimously approved form inside the umma. But is it possible today, given the principles of critical epistemology, to propose a system of knowledge or science particular to Islamic thought? What are the theoretical conditions of a modem theology not only for political institutions, but also for universal knowledge, in the three revealed religions? We are in a crisis of legitimacy; that is why we can speak only of heuristic ways of thinking.
Remark 5.1: This line is opposed to the dogmatic assurance of theology based on the unquestionable legitimacy of the Shari'a derived from Revelation or the classical ontology of the first Being, the neo-Platonic One, the Origin from which the Intellect derives and to which it desires to return. That is why the problem of the state and civil society is crucial today. Why should an individual obey the state? How is the legitimacy of power monopolized by a group over all other established groups?
6. The search for ultimate meaning depends on the radical question concerning the relevance and existence of an ultimate meaning. We have no right to reject the possibility of its existence. What is questionable is how to base all our thoughts on the postulate of its existence. Again, we encounter the true responsibility of the critical reason: To reach a better understanding of the relationship between meaning and reality, we must, first, improve our intellectual equipment-vocabulary, methods, strategies, procedures, definitions, and horizons of inquiry. 3. Both ignore the decisive dimension of historicity to which even the revealed message is subjected. Historicity is the unthinkable and the unthought in medieval thought. It will be the conquest-not yet everywhere complete-of intellectual modernity.2 4. Historiography (ta'rikh) has been practiced in Islamic thought as a collection of information, events, biographies (tar-jim, siyar), geneologies (nasab), knowledge on countries (buldan), and various other subjects. This collection of facts is related to a chronology representing time as stable, without a dynamic movement of change and progress. No link is established between time as a historical dynamic process (historicity) and the elements of knowledge collected by historiography. Ibn Khaldun can be cited as the exception who introduced the concept of society as an object of knowledge and thought,3 but even he could not think of religion, society, history, or philosophy as related levels and ways to achieve an improved intelligibility. On the contrary, he contributed to eliminating philosophy and to isolating the Ash'ari vision of Islam from history as a global evolution of societies influenced by various theological expressions of Islam.
Muslims do not feel concerned by the secularized culture and thought produced since the sixteenth century.
5. In the case of Islamic thought, the triumph of two major official orthodoxies with the Sunnis (since the fifth century Hijra) and the Shi'a (first with the Fatimids and second with the Safavids in Iran) imposed a mode of thinking narrower than those illustrated in the classical period (first to fifth century Hijra). Contemporary Islamic thought is under the influence of categories, themes, beliefs, and procedures of reasoning developed during the scholastic age (seventh to eighth century Hijra) more than it is open to the pluralism which characterized classical thought.
6. The historical evolution and intellectual structure of Islamic thought create the necessity of starting with a critique of Islamic reason (theological, legal, historiographical) as well as of philosophical reason as it has been understood and used through Aristotelian, Platonic, and Plotinist traditions (or legacies).
We shall not do this here.4 We have to think more clearly about new conditions and ways to think Islam today.
Intellectual modernity started with Renaissance and Reform movements in sixteenth-century Europe. The study of pagan antiquity and the demand for freedom to read the Bible without the mediation of priests (or "managers of the sacred," as they are sometimes called) changed the conditions of intellectual activities. Later, scientific discoveries, political revolutions, secularized knowledge, and historically criticized knowledge (historicism practiced as philosophies of history) changed more radically the whole intellectual structure of thought for the generations involved in the Industrial Revolution with its continuous consequences. This evolution was achieved in Europe without any participation of Islamic thought or Muslim societies dominated, on the contrary, by a rigid, narrow conser-27 vatism. This is why Muslims do not feel concerned by the secularized culture and thought produced since the sixteenth century. It is legitimate, in this historical process leading to intellectual modernity, to differentiate between the ideological aspects limited to the conjunctural situations of Western societies and the anthropological structures of knowledge discovered through scientific research. Islamic thought has to reject or criticize the former and to apply the latter in its own contexts.
We cannot, for example, accept the concept of secularization or laicite as it has been historically elaborated and used in Western societies. There is a political and social dimension of this concept represented by the struggle for power and the tools of legitimization between the church and the bourgeoisie. The intellectual implications of the issue concern the possibility-political and cultural-of separating education, learning, and research from any control by the state as well as by the church. This possibility remains problematical everywhere.
Similarly 
III. From the Unthinkable to the Thinkable
Islam is presented and lived as a definite system of beliefs and non-beliefs which cannot be submitted to any critical inquiry. Thus, it divides the space of thinking into two parts: the unthinkable and the thinkable. Both concepts are historical and not, at first, philosophical. The respective domain of each of them changes through history and varies from one social group to another. Before the systemization by Shafi'i of the concept ofsunna and the utili use of it, many aspects of Islamic thought were still thinkable. They became unthinkable after the triumph of Shafi'i's theory and also the elaboration of authentic "collections," as mentioned earlier. Similarly, the problems related to the historical process of collecting the Qur'an in an official mushaf became more and more unthinkable under the official pressure of the caliphate because the Qur'an has been used since the beginning of the Islamic state to legitimize political power and to unify the umma. The last official decision clos-ing any discussion of the readings of the received orthodox mushafwas made by the qidi Ibn Mujahid after the trial of Ibn Shunbudh (fourth/tenth century).
We can add a third significant example to show how a thinkable is transformed into an unthinkable by the ideological decision of the leading politico-religious group. The Mu'tazila endeavored by their ijtihad to make thinkable the decisive question of God's created speech, but in the fifth century the caliph al-Qadir made this question unthinkable by imposing, in his famous 'Aqida, the dogma of the uncreated Qur'an as the "orthodox" belief (cf. G. Makdisi, Ibn 'Aqil et la resurgence de l'Islam traditionaliste au Xie siecle, Damascus, 1963).
As we have said, the unthinkable or the not yet thought (I'impense) in Islamic thought has been enlarged since intellectual modernity was elaborated in the West. All the theories developed by sociology and anthropology on religion are still unknown, or rejected as irrelevant, by contemporary Islamic thought without any intellectual argument or scientific consideration.
It is true that traditional religions play decisive roles in our secularized, modernized societies. We even see secular religions emerging in industrialized societies, like fascism in Germany and Italy, Stalinism and Maoism in the communist world, and many new sects in liberal democracies. If we look at the revealed religions through the parameters set by recent secular religions, we are obliged to introduce new criteria to define religion as a universal phenomenon. To the traditional view of religion as totally revealed, created, and given by God, we cannot simply substitute the sociological theory of religion generated by a socio-historical process according to the cultural values and representations available in each group, community, or society. We must rethink the whole question of the nature and the functions of religion through the traditional theory of divine origin and the modern secular explanation of religion as a social historical production. This means, in the case of Islam, rewriting the whole history of Islam as a revealed religion and as an active factor, among others, in the historical evolution of societies where it has been or still is received as a religion. Orientalist scholars have already started this study, inquiring even into the social and cultural conditions of thejfhiliyya period in which Islam emerged; but I do not know any Orientalist who has raised the epistemological problems implicit in this historicist approach. No single intellectual effort is devoted to considering the consequences of historicist presentations of the origins and functions of a religion given and received as being revealed.5
We need to create an intellectual and cultural framework in which all historical, sociological, anthropological, and psychological presentations of revealed religions could be integrated into a system of thought and evolving knowledge. We cannot abandon the problem of revelation as irrelevant to human and social studies and let it be monopolized by theological speculation. One has to ask, then, why sociology and anthropology have been interested in the question of the sacred and in ritual, but not in revelation. Why, conversely, has theology considered revelation, but not so much the sacred and the secular, until it has been influenced by anthropology and social sciences. The societies where the Book-or Holy Scriptures-is used as the revelation of the divine will developed a global vision of the world, history, meaning, and human destiny by the use of hermeneutic procedures. All juridical, ethical, political, and intellectual norms had to be derived from the textual forms of the revelation. The Torah, Canon Law, and the Shari'a have been elaborated on the basis of the same vision of revealed Truth and "rational" procedures from which norms have been derived. There is a common conception of human destiny commanded by the eschatological perspective (the search for salvation by obedience to God's will) and guided in this world by the norms of the law.
The new dimension which I aim to explain by the concept of the Societies of the Book is the process of historicization of a divine category: Revelation. The believers in the three religions claim, even in the context of our secularized culture, that divine law derived from Revelation is not subject to historicity. It cannot be changed by any human legislation and it is a totally rationalized law. Scientific knowledge cannot demonstrate that this belief is based on a wrong assumption, but it can explain how it is possible psychologically to maintain the affirmation of a revealed law in the form presented in the Torah, Canon Law, and the Sharica, against the evidence of its historicity.
Traditional theological thought has not used the concept of social imaginaire and the related notions of myth, symbol, sign, or metaphor in the new meanings already mentioned. It refers constantly to reason as the faculty of true knowledge, differentiated from knowledge based on the representations of the imagination. The methodology elaborated and used by jurists-theologians shares with the Aristotelian tradition the same postulate of rationality as founding the true knowledge and excluding the constructions of the imagination. In fact, an analysis of the discourse produced by both trends of thinking-the theological and the philosophical-reveals a simultaneous use of reason and imagination. Beliefs and convictions are often used as "arguments" to "demonstrate" propositions of knowledge. In this stage of thinking, metaphor is understood and used as a rhetorical device to add an aesthetic emotion to the real content of the words; it was not perceived in its creative force as a semantic innovation or in its power to shift the discourse to a global metaphorical organization requiring the full participation of a coherent imagination. The philosophers, however, recognized the power that imagination as a faculty of privileged knowledge bestowed on the prophet especially. Ibn Sina and Ibn Tufayl used this faculty in each of their accounts of Hayy ibn yaqzan, but this did 31 century to the contemporary revivalist movements. The segmentary groups perpetuating oral cultures and traditions and adhering to archaic beliefs under the name of Islam, have resisted to their integration into the Muslim state. This is why the 'ulama' and contemporary-regularly condemned the "superstitions" and "heresies" of these groups, as long as they resisted the norms of the Societies of the Book.
... Religions are superior to any scientific theory because they give imaginative solutions to permanent issues in human life, and they mobilize the social imaginaire with beliefs, mythical explanations, and rites. (For more explanations, see my Lectures du Coran, op. cit.) V. Strategies for Deconstruction ... Thinking about our new historical situation is a positive enterprise. We are not aiming for a negative critique of the previous attempts at the emancipation of human existence as much as we wish to propose relevant answers to pending and pressing questions. This is why we prefer to speak about a strategy for deconstruction. We need to deconstruct the social imaginaire structured over centuries by the phenomenon of the Book as well as the secularizing forces of the material civilization6 since the seventeenth century.
We speak of one social imaginaire because secularization has not totally eliminated from any society all the elements, principles, and postulates organizing the social imaginaire in the Societies of the Book. This is, I know, a controversial point among historians. Karl Lowith (Meaning in History, 1968) has shown that so-called modem ideas are just the secularized reshaping and re-expressing of medieval Christian ideas. More recently, Regis Debray (Critique de la raison politique, Gallimard, 1981) underlined the Christian origins of the present socialist utopia.
Hans Blumenberg tried to refute these positions in his dissertation on The Legitimacy ofthe Moder Age (MIT Press, 1983). He showed how modernity is an alternative to Christian medieval conceptions. According to him, the modem idea of progress is the product of an imminent process of development rather than a messianic one. Long-term scientific progress guided by pluralist method and experimentation, continuity of problems rather than solutions, and history as a positive whole process cut from the transcendent God, are characteristics of the modem age. Should one, then, accept the definition of secularization as a long-term process through which religious ties, attitudes toward transcendence, the expectation of an afterlife, ritual performances, firmly established forms of speech, a typical structure of the individual imaginaire, specific articulation and use of reason and imagination, become a private concern separated from public life? One could add the triumph of pragmatism, which gives priority to action over contemplation, verification over truth, method over system, logic over rhetoric, future over past, and becoming over being. 33 
